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CURRENT ISSUES
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE -
REQUIRING A PRELIMINARY
SHOWING OF RELEVANCY AND
NEED IN GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The power of the grand jury is necessarily broad in order to
perform its "dual function of determining if there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protect-
ing citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions."1 Generally,
this power includes the ability to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments, absent any showing of relevancy and need.2 The grand
* Mr. O'Donnell has received the 1986 New York State Bar Legal Ethics Award based in
part on his authorship of this article.
' Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972). The grand jury frequently is de-
scribed as an agency designed to function as a "shield and a sword." W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.1 (1984). It is used as a "shield" to protect against mis-
taken prosecutions by determining if an indictment should be issued. See United States v.
Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983). In making that determination, it screens the
prosecutor's case to make sure that there is sufficient evidence to bring charges against the
accused. See id. The grand jury also functions as a "sword" in its ability to uncover evi-
dence not previously available to the government and thereby secure convictions that
might otherwise not be obtained. See In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 704 (1st Cir. 1980).
2 See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919). The Court in Blair noted that
the grand jury has the power to subpoena witnesses and documents. Id. The Court stated
that the grand jury's authority to resort to compulsory process had been recognized in
England as early as 1612, and the inquisitorial function of the grand jury was well estab-
lished at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Id. at 279-80. The Blair Court
concluded:
[The grand juryl is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisi-
tion, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of pro-
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jury's power, however, is not without limitation.a Grand jury sub-
poenas are subject to the assertion of constitutional, statutory, and
common law privileges. 4
The attorney-client privilege is one such limitation on the sub-
poena power of the grand jury.5 Generally, the privilege aims to
insure that clients receive the best possible legal advice and repre-
sentation by protecting, from involuntary disclosure, certain confi-
priety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether
any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
id. at 282.
Traditionally, the grand jury has been accorded carte blanche in its inquiries into criminal
activities. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). The Calandra Court
stated: "The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of wit-
nesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the techni-
cal procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials." Id. Thus,
the grand jury's investigative powers must be broad if they are to insure fair and effectivelaw enforcement. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972); Costello v. United States,350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956).
In this country, the fifth amendment requires a grand jury indictment for the prosecu-
tion of serious crimes. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment reads in part, "Noperson shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . ." Id.
1 See Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959). The powers of a grand jury are
supervised by a judge of the district court, In re Grand jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 17 (lstCir. 1984) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)); see In re Pantojas, 628F.2d 701, 705 (lst Cir. 1980), from which their subpoena and contempt procedures arederived. See Pantojas, 628 F.2d at 705. To control any abuse of discretion, the district courtis given the power to police the grand jury's subpoena powers and, on motion, may "quash
or modify the subpoena 'if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.'" Grand July
Matters, 751 F.2d at 17 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)).
Grand jury subpoenas are also limited by the assertion of any recognized constitutional,
statutory, or common law privilege. R. MCNAMARA, CONSTrUrrIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE § 7.05 at 119 (1982). The privileges available to witnesses depend on thelaw of the jurisdiction where the grand jury is empaneled. Id.
" R. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, § 7.05'at 119; see, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.391, 405 (1976) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination may bar enforcement
of subpoena); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 1975)(common law attorney-client privilege upheld in grand jury proceeding); Beach v. Shanley,62 N.Y.2d 241, 245-46, 465 N.E.2d 304, 306, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (1984) (reportersprotected by state "shield law" from disclosure of sources to grand jury).
I R. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, § 7.05 at 119; see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones),517 F.2d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center), 615
F. Supp. 958, 964-65 (D. Mass. 1985).
Professor Wigmore stated that the attorney-client privilege is applicable when confiden-
tial legal advice of any kind is sought from an attorney by a client. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2292 at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961). These communications are permanently protectedfrom disclosure by the attorney at the client's insistence unless the client waives the protec-
tion. Id.
Attorney-Client Privilege
dential communications between an attorney and his client.' The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage the client to make com-
plete disclosure to his attorney, without fear that the information
may be used against him at a later time.7 The privilege, however,
does not protect every communication between the attorney and
his client, but rather, only protects those confidential communica-
tions properly made within the scope of the relationship.8
6 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). The attorney-client privilege is appli-
cable from the moment a person seeks to obtain legal assistance. See id.; United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
In United Shoe, District Judge Wyzanski set forth the classic formulation of the attorney-
client privilege. See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358-59. According to Judge Wyzanski, the
privilege applied if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person
to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal pro-
ceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id.
7 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The attorney-client privi-
lege is the oldest of privileges protecting confidential communications. Id. It was accepted
as early as the reign of Elizabeth 1. See 8 J. WIGMORF, supra note 5, § 2290 at 542-45. At
that time, the purpose of the privilege was to prevent the attorney from being required to
take an oath and testify against his client, thereby violating the attorney's honor as a gen-
tleman. Id. Originally, the privilege belonged to the attorney, but it is generally accepted
today that the privilege belongs to the client. Comment, Grand Jury - Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and the Right to Counsel For the Party Under Investigation, 19 WAKE FOREST L REv. 487,
494-95 (1983).
Today, the most frequently urged justification for the attorney-client privilege is to "en-
courage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys." Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2291 at 545; § 2306 at 590. In
United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained the rationale underlying the attorney-client
privilege as follows:
[Iln our legal system the client should make full disclosure to the attorney so that
the advice given is sound, so that the attorney can give all appropriate protection to
the client's interest, and so that proper defenses are raised if litigation results. The
attorney-client privilege promotes such disclosure by promising that communications
revealed for these legitimate purposes will be held in strict confidence.... Thus, the
attorney-client privilege is central to the' legal system and adversary process.
Id. at 1355.
s See In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). In
Walsh, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed an order quashing grand jury
subpoenas directing an attorney to testify in an investigation of the disappearance, under
suspicious circumstances, of a former client. Id. at 495. The court's rationale was that the
privilege was not a blanket privilege. Id. at 494. Whatever privilege existed would have to
be asserted in response to each question. Id. The privilege would not apply to facts that the
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The assertion of the attorney-client privilege in defense of a
grand jury subpoena duces tecum9 has caused some disagreement
among the courts.10 All courts recognize some form of the com-
mon law privilege protecting communications made in confidence
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice." The problem arises,
however, when the subpoena is directed at communications that
traditionally have not been protected by the privilege, such as a
client's identity or fee information.12
Although limitations on grand jury power are normally not al-
lowed absent a claim of privilege, 3 the district court, in the exer-
attorney had independently observed, such as the appearance of his client. Id.
It is not sufficient to show only that an attorney-client relationship existed, see United
States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281-82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964).
Rather, the proponent of the privilege must show that the privilege is applicable to the
specific communications sought to be discovered. Id. The attorney-client relationship does
not create an automatic "cloak of protection ... draped around all occurrences and con-
versations which have any bearing, direct or indirect, upon the relationship of the attorney
with his client." Id.
Communications made to an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activities
are not protected by the privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026,
1028 (5th Cir. 1982). In these cases, the government must make a primafacie showing that
the attorney was retained in order to promote criminal or fraudulent activity. Id.; see also
United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939) ("It has
always been settled that communications from a client to an attorney about a crime or
fraud to be committed are not privileged.").
9 Subpoena duces tecum is defined as "a process by which the court, at the instances of a
party, commands a witness who has in his possession or control some document or paper
that is pertinent to the issues of a pending controversy, to produce it at the trial." BLACt's
LAw DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
10 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1222 (9th Cir. 1983)
(attorney-client privilege protects only those confidential communications made in order to
obtain legal assistance); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (attor-
ney-client privilege should be construed as narrowly as possible); In re Grand Jury Witness(Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1982) (accounts receivable records, time records,
bills, retainer agreements, and records of payments held to contain both privileged and
non-privileged material); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir.
1975) (certain communications not normally protected are under the attorney-client
privilege).
"See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
'a See supra note 10; see also In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1980) (attorney
could be compelled to testify as to number of times he met with client and whether attor-
ney had instructed client to appear before grand jury).
"* See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center), 615 F. Supp. 958, 963-64 (D.
Mass. 1985); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir.
1973) (government required to show relevancy of each requested document to investiga-
tion and that documents not sought for any improper purpose). Cf United States v. Orsini,
424 F. Supp. 229, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affid, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 997 (1977) (newsgatherer entitled to a qualified privilege in New York before having
to disclose confidential sources in criminal proceeding).
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cise of its supervisory power, may quash a subpoena that is "un-
reasonable or oppressive." 14 This supervisory power is derived
from several sources. 1' First, the district court has the power to
call the grand jury into existence. 6 Secondly, the district court
may issue subpoenas 17 and has the duty to enforce them."8 In the
context of subpoenas to attorneys for information regarding their
clients, there are mixed opinions as to whether this supervisory
power allows the district court to impose a preliminary showing
on the prosecutor prior to issuance of the subpoena.19
Most courts take the view that the government is under no obli-
gation to make a preliminary showing of relevancy or need when
subpoenaing an attorney's files or requiring him to testify.
20
Under this view, the only communications protected are those
proven by the attorney or the client to fall within the traditional
notion of the privilege.21
Another way in which this problem has been addressed has
been to require the government to make a preliminary showing of
some sort before compelling disclosure of these documents.
22 A
federal district court has required the government to make a pre-
liminary showing of relevancy and reasonable need when subpoe-
naing the records of an attorney whose client is a witness before a
grand jury.2 8 Although the communications are not considered
14 FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(c).
10 See infra notes' 16-18 and accompanying text.
3' 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1983); FED. R CRIM. P. 6(a).
IT FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
528 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1983).
1, See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center), 615 F. Supp. 958, 963-65"(D.
Mass. 1985). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th
Cir. 1983) (no preliminary showing necessary); In re Special, Sept. 1983, Grand Jury
(Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538, 541 (S.D. Ind.), a.'d, In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985)
(government under no obligation to show relevancy or need; however, attorney-client priv-
ilege may be invoked).
20 Set In re Special, Sept. 1983, Grand Jury (Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538, 541 (S.D. Ind.),
affid, In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman),
708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983): In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d
1221, 1222 (9th Cir. 1983).
2 "See In re GrandJury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re Special,
Sept. 1983, Grand Jury (Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538, 541 (S.D. Ind.), arf'd, In re Klein, 776
F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985).
2 "See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
2" In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center), 615 F. Supp. 958, 963-64 (D. Mass.
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privileged, this added protection is given in the interests of pro-
tecting the attorney-client relationship.24
The former treatment of these subpoenas is followed by the ma-
jority of the circuits.2 5 These circuits allow protection for those
confidential communications proven to be privileged."6 The party
seeking to invoke the privilege, however, bears the burden of
showing the existence of the attorney-client relationship and the
confidential nature of the communication.2 7 No preliminary show-
ing of relevancy and need is required before issuance of a grand
jury subpoena to an attorney.28 All that is needed for the issuance
of the subpoena is a showing of legitimate purpose which is de-
1985). In Legal Serus. Center, the federal district court required a showing of relevancy and
need when documents and records of an attorney were subpoenaed. Id. at 964. In its deci-
sion, the district court relied upon the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985). See Legal Servs.
Center, 615 F. Supp. at 963-64. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, en
bane, vacated the Doe decision. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d
238 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986). It is submitted, however, that
the district court's decision and reasoning is still valid because of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701 (Ist Cir. 1980).
In Pantojas, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.expressly declined to adopt any
specific procedure and impose it on the district courts. Pantojas, 628 F.2d at 704-05. In-
stead, the court endorsed the concept that the district courts should control the grand jury,
id. at 705, and that they should feel free to require the government to show relevancy and
need. Id. It is suggested that Pantojas would allow the district courts reviewed by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals to adopt the original rationale of the Doe panel.
" See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1010, vacated on other
grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center),
615 F. Supp. 958, 964 (D. Mass. 1985).
" See In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceeding (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re Special, Sept.
1983, Grand Jury (Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Ind.), afd, In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th
Cir. 1985).
2 In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceeding (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (1 1th Cir. 1983); In re Special,
Sept. 1983, Grand Jury (Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538, 542 (S.D. Ind.), affd, In re Klein, 776
F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985).
" In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re Special,
Sept. 1983, Grand jury (Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538, 542 (S.D. Ind.), affd, In re Klein, 776
F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985). A party seeking to invoke the attorney-client privilege in defense
of a subpoena duces tecum must first establish that an attorney-client relationship exists. In
re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980). Once such a relationship is established, a
claim of privilege must be made for each question and/or document requested. United
States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983). "[A] blanket claim of privilege is
unacceptable." Id.
" See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
118
Attorney-Client Privilege
rived from a presumption that the government obeys the law."
The approach which requires a preliminary showing before sub-
poenaing an attorney whose client is a witness before the grand
jury places the initial burden on the government before allowing
access to information concerning the attorney-client relation-
ship.30 The rationale supporting this qualified protection is two-
fold. First, the disclosure by an attorney of any communication
between himself and his client may have a chilling effect on the
attorney-client relationship.3 ' Clients may be reluctant to confide
in the attorney if the information revealed in apparent confidence
21 See In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983).
Initially, when the government seeks information through the use of a subpoena, it must
demonstrate a legitimate interest in the requested information. Id. This interest is pre-
sumed to be legitimate because there is a presumption that the government obeys the law.
Id.; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir. 1977). Rely-
ing on that presumption, the Hergenroeder court found no reason to require any prelimi-
nary showing by the government, and refused to create unnecessary delays in the grand
jury process. Id.
30 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield 1), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973). In
Schofield I, the court required the government to make some showing by affidavit that the
documents sought were relevant to an investigation being conducted by a grand jury. Id.
The documents must be properly within the jurisdiction of the grand jury and cannot be
sought for an improper purpose. Id. Once the government had sufficiently established need
and relevancy, the burden shifted to the defendant "to demonstrate the applicability of
one or more privileges." Id. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center), 615 F.
Supp. 958, 964 (D. Mass. 1985).
31 In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009, vacated on other
grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982). The Harvey decision was vacated because the subject
of the grand jury investigation took flight, not because the reasoning of the decision was
unsound. See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 697 F.2d 112, 113 (4th Cir.
1982).
The court in Harvey noted that if an attorney complied with the subpoena, there was the
possibility that a "substantial chilling effect" on client-attorney communications would be
likely, especially if the end result were the indictment of the client. See Harvey, 676 F.2d at
1009 n.4. See generally Note, Grand Jury - Attorney-Client Privilege and the Right to Retain
Counsel for the Party Under Investigation - In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 19
WAKE FOREsT L REV. 487 (1983). "If the attorney complies with the subpoena and appears
before the grand jury behind closed doors, a substantial chilling effect on truthful commu-
nications from the client to the attorney thereafter would be likely, especially if the client is
indicted." Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1009 n.4.
The precedential value of the Harvey decision has been questioned by the Fourth Circuit,
see United States v. Murchower, 718 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1983), however, the Harvey ra-
tionale was relied upon by the district court in deciding In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal
Servs. Center), 615 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1985). Since the decision was vacated for rea-
sons totally unrelated to the subpoena, see Harvey, 697 F.2d at 113, its precedential value
should not be impaired. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1222
n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (court free to adopt Harvey rationale but declined to do so).
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may be subject to disclosure before a grand jury.32 As a result, the
courts should deem proper an exercise of their discretionary su-
pervisory power over federal grand juries in the interest of pre-
serving the attorney-client relationship. 3
A second rationale for this protection is that a subpoena served
upon an attorney in regard to information in the attorney's pos-
session may infringe upon a person's sixth amendment right to be
represented by counsel of one's choice."' This is because the sub-
poena may result in the disqualification of the attorney should his
testimony be used at a subsequent trial.3 5
The fundamental difference between these two approaches is in
who bears the initial burden of coming forward to prove the valid-
ity or invalidity of the subpoena." In determining who should
bear this initial burden, the courts should balance the public inter-
est in effective grand jury investigations against both the attorney-
client privilege and the right to counsel of one's choice.,
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 .(5th Cir. 1975). The
purpose of the attorney-client privilege would be undermined if lawyers could be subpoe-
naed without some safeguards. Id. Clients are not adequately protected if prosecutors can
compel disclosure of documents by attorneys whenever that attorney represented a sus-
pected individual. Id. But see Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1013 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Judge Murnaghan stated that there was no merit in the argument that a subpoena
served on a lawyer would have a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship. Harvey,
676 F.2d at 1013 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). He stated that "[a] client who loses faith in
his lawyer because the lawyer complies with the law ...has adopted an unreasonable
stance." Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). It is submitted that, although this stance may well
be unreasonable, it is naive to assume that the client would not feel betrayed if his own
attorney produced information which subsequently became the basis of an indictment.
33 See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1012 (4th Cir. 1982);
see also FED. IL CRIM. P. 17(a), (c); cf. In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.
1984) (grand jury subpoenas subject to supervisory powers of judges).
-4 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 254-57 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) (Cardamone, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986). The Federal Consti-
tution guarantees to an individual the right to be represented by counsel of one's own
choice. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." Id.
33 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1985),
vacated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986).
3s See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
11 Cf Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91 (1972) (balanced public interest with newsgatherer's
nondisclosure privilege and first amendment rights); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served
Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985) (balanced public interest against sixth amendment
right), vacated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986); In re Special
Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (4th Cir. 1982) (balanced public
interest against attorney-client privilege).
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The proper maintenance of both the attorney-client relation-
ship and the investigative function of the grand jury is essential to
the orderly administration of the law."8 It is suggested that al-
though these competing interests cannot be completely harmo-
nized, the most equitable balance would be attained by requiring
that the prosecutor make a preliminary showing of relevancy and
need to the court before compelling disclosure by the attorney of
this type of information. By analogizing a grand jury subpoena
directed at legal fees and client identities, material generally not
privileged,3 9 to a grand jury subpoena directed at statements
made during an attorney-client relationship in furtherance of a
crime or fraud, statements also considered unprivileged,40 this ar-
ticle will attempt to illustrate the reasonableness of a judicially re-
quired preliminary showing in this subpoena context.
Although a judicial remedy could reasonably be implemented, it
is further submitted that should the judiciary decline to take a
s Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1960). See United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1976). The Court in Mandujano recognized that the power of the
grand jury is necessarily broad, but that it is limited by the assertion of a sufficiently impor-
tant competing interest. Id. Compare United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 844 (1974)
(grand jury's investigative powers must be broad to properly perform intended function)
with Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (attorney-client privilege oldest
common law privilege and serves to promote public interests and ends). See generally Devel-
opments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L REv. 1450, 1504-09 (1985)
(courts must balance benefits of disclosure with cost to society of compelled disclosure).
$" In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1222 (9th Cir. 1983); In re
Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (11 th Cir. 1982); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). Although not generally privileged, the courts have
stated that in certain circumstances, information concerning client identities and fee ar-
rangements cannot be disclosed: 1) the "legal advice" exception, see In re Shargel, 742 F.2d
61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (client identity and fee information not privileged unless disclosure
impairs attorney's ability to give informed legal advice); 2) the "last link" exception; and 3)
the "communication rationale" exception. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th
Cir. 1960). In Baird, the court stated: "If the identification of the client conveys informa-
tion which ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication
between attorney and client, then the privilege should extend to such identification in the
absence of other factors." Id. at 633. But see In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir.
1983) (client identity and fee information not privileged even if disclosure may evidence
wrongdoing by client).
40 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum, 773 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Berkley & Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 548,
553 (8th Cir. 1980))- In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982). Cf. MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (attorney may reveal "confidences" of client to
prevent commission of crime).
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more active supervisory role in the grand jury process, then state
and federal legislatures should act to pass laws which would re-
quire a preliminary showing of relevancy and need in order to
preserve the attorney-client relationship. This requirement will
not only protect against deterioration of the attorney-client privi-
lege but also control any actual or perceived abuses of the prose-
cutor through the grand jury.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Necessity for Grand Jury Reform
Historically, the grand jury as an institution has been held in
the highest regard by the judiciary. 1 It has been seen as serving
the dual function of insuring thorough and speedy investigation of
criminal activity as well as protecting the public from having un-
founded criminal charges filed against them.42 The historical per-
ception of the grand jury as a protector of the innocent has be-
come the subject of increasing skepticism.' Certain commentators
have gone so far as to call for the abolition of the grand jury.4 '
This outcry has been prompted by actual and perceived45 abuses
" See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1962).
"' See supra note I and accompanying text.
4, See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (grand
jury no longer protects citizens but is tool of prosecutor); Id. at 45-47 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (questioning assumption of grand jury independence and noting possibility of prosecu-
torial abuses). The Court in United States v. Dionisio conceded that the historical perception
of the grand jury might be inaccurate. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
The Court stated that "[t]he grand jury may not always serve its historic role as a protec-
tive bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor,
- . ." but declined to place restrictions on the grand jury's investigative power. Id. See also
Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1265-75 (1976) (detailing historical evolution of federal grand jury
system, including prosecutorial abuses). See generally L. CLARK. THE GRAND JURY (1975)
(grand jury abuses throughout history with emphasis placed on misuse during Nixon
administration).
4 Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 (1973).
Campbell contended that the prosecutor should be given the power for, and responsibility
to, initiate criminal prosecutions. Id. at 180. "Prosecutions should be commenced upon the
filing of an information signed by the prosecutor, and be followed by a probable cause
hearing before a judicial officer who would determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to allow the prosecution to continue to trial." Id.
45 Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9 (1982) (lawyer should avoid
appearance of impropriety); A.BA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972) (judge
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of the grand jury system which are inherent in the nature of the
institution as it exists today.46 "Overzealous" prosecutors47 seek-
ing political advancement, or political administrations with im-
proper motives,48 often misuse the grand jury as a tool of harass-
ment. 49 These considerations suggest that the presumption that
"the government obeys the law"50 should be done away with, and
that some preliminary showing related to proper purpose should
be required.51
should avoid appearance of impropriety). Both lawyers and judges are instructed to avoid
even the appearance of impropriety so as to strengthen the public's faith in the legal pro-
fession. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-1 (1982); A.BA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Commentary (1972). Although it has been argued that abuses of the
grand jury are exaggerated and that criticism of the grand jury process is "superficial," see
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976), it is submitted that it is proper to
require some safeguards against improper use of the grand jury process in order to
strengthen the public's faith in the criminal justice system, as well as the legal entities em-
powered to fairly administer the law.
4" See D. EMERSON, GRAND JURY REFORM: A REVIEW OF KEY IssuEs 14 (1983). The grand
jury had historically functioned as a unit created to investigate criminal activity based upon
personal beliefs and leads. See Campbell, supra note 44, at 175. Today, it can not serve this
purpose because we no longer live in isolated communities and people very seldom have
enough knowledge of the suspect to return an indictment without the "assistance of the
prosecution." Id. at 177-78. Thus, the grand jury is an arm of the prosecution since the
only means of gathering and sorting information are under the control of the prosecutor.
Id. The potential of harassment inherent in an unrestrained grand jury inquiry, referred to
as a "fishing expedition", was noted and criticized by justice Marshall, see United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 48 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7 Cf In re GrandJury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1984) (categorizing harassment
as possible "overzealousness"). The district court found that the actions of the United
States Attorney constituted harassment. See In re Grand jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103,
107 (D.N.H. 1984). The appellate court refused to affirm this finding, labelling the prose-
cutor's action possible "overzealousness." In re Grand jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 19.
'8 See L. CLARK. THE GRAND JURY 31-38 (1975). In his book, Clark claimed that certain
presidential administrations, particularly John Mitchell of the Nixon administration, had
politicized the Department of Justice and, consequently, the grand jury process. Id.
4 See In re Grand jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103, 107 (D.N.H. 1984); see also supra notes
46-47 (historic abuses of grand jury).
8 United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand
jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir. 1977).
"' In re Grand jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973); In re
Grand jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center), 615 F. Supp. 958, 964 (D. Mass. 1985). See In
re Special Grand jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1011, vacated on other grounds,
697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555
F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir. 1977). "In view of the presumption that the government obeys the
law ... [there is] no reason to inject into routine grand jury investigations the delay and
imposition upon district courts that will be opened up by a rule institutionalizing these
disclaiming affidavits." Id. at 686.
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B. Preliminary Showing of Relevancy and Need - Not Unreasonable
Requiring a preliminary showing has been rejected by a number
of courts as placing an unreasonable burden on the grand jury's
investigative powers.52 This rejection has been partially based on
the Supreme Court holdings in United States v. Dionisio53 and
United States v. Mara." In both cases, the Court held that a prelim-
inary showing of reasonableness was unnecessary before issuance
of subpoenas for voice and handwriting exemplars . 5 These deci-
sions are distinguishable from cases involving an attorney-client
relationship. In Dionisio and Mara, the Court held that a subpoena
for voice and handwriting exemplars was not a violation of the
fourth amendment. 56 The Court stated that these subpoenas were
not unreasonably broad and therefore did not infringe on any
constitutional rights.5 7 Thus, the Supreme Court did not find any
reasonable justification for imposing the delays resulting from a
preliminary showing upon the grand jury.58
Although the sixth amendment does not attach at the grand
jury stage, 59 certain aspects of the attorney-client relationship that
are protected under the sixth amendment would be permanently
lost or impaired if the attorney was subpoenaed. 0 Any delay
5 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) (mini-trials and preliminary show-
ings impede public's interest in expeditious administration of law); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (no preliminary showing required for subpoenas to reporters
because of excessive interference with grand jury).
In the context of grand jury subpoenas aimed at attorneys in an ongoing attorney-client
relationship, a majority of the circuits have also rejected any requirement of a preliminary
showing. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 243-44 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986); In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1985); In re
Grand Jury Proceeding in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983).
3 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
- 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
*" Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15; Mara, 410 U.S. at 22.
"Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15; Mara, 410 U.S. at 22.
" Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15; Mara, 410 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15; Mara, 410 U.S. at 22.
0' See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 243-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986).
" See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009, vacated on other
grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated
in Harvey that by subpoenaing an attorney "there is a strong possibility that a wedge will be
driven between the attorney and the client and the relationship will be destroyed." Id. at
1009. If the attorney should appear before a grand jury and testify, then the possibility
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which might be caused by a preliminary showing could not be
considered unreasonable since this delay may effectively keep the
attorney-client relationship intact.61
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Schofield I),2 required a preliminary showing before
the issuance of any subpoenas.68 In Schofield I, the court required
a preliminary showing that the items requested were relevant to
the grand jury proceedings and that the investigation was prop-
erly within its jurisdiction and not sought primarily for another
purpose." It is submitted that a proper standard for a preliminary
showing, in this instance, would be relevancy and need. The "rele-
vancy" prong would be satisfied by a very minimal showings and
all that would be required to show "need" would be a good faith
effort by the prosecutor to procure the information elsewhere."6
that the client will be less than candid with his attorney will be dramatically increased. Id.
at 1009 n.4.
The district court of New Hampshire went further than the Harvey court, stating that to
refer to this adverse effect as chilling would be mild, see In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F.
Supp. 103, 107 (D.N.H. 1984), and "[tlo permit it would have an arctic effect with the
non.salutory purpose of freezing criminal defense attorneys into inanimate ice floes, bereft
of the succor of constitutional safeguards." Id.
In the event that the attorney does not comply with a grand jury subpoena, he can be
found in contempt by the district court empowered to enforce the subpoena, 28 U.S.C. §
1826 (1982), and can then be subject to other penalties which will disrupt the representa-
tion of his client's cause. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Servs. Center), 615 F.Supp.
958, 964 (D. Mass. 1985); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
41 Cf. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972); United States v. Mara, 410
U.S. 19, 21-22 (1972) (no fiduciary relationship threatened by subpoena). It is submitted
that in order to conform with the reasonable expectations of the attorney and his client, an
attorney should not be compelled to give potentially damaging information concerning his
client to a grand jury unless this is shown to be necessary.
486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
e Id. at 93.
"Id.
I See In re Morgan, 377 F. Supp. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In defining relevancy for
purposes of a grand jury investigation, the court stated: "Relevancy in the context of a
Grand Jury proceeding is not probative relevancy, for it cannot be known in advance
whether the document produced will actually advance the investigation. It is rather a rele-
vancy to the subject matter of the investigation." Id.
" Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (when adversary's work product discoverable). The work
product doctrine codified in Rule 26 states that a party to a civil action can discover docu-
ments and other tangible items prepared in anticipation of adversarial proceedings, but
"only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Id. Although this rule by its terms
only applies to civil actions, the courts have recognized its applicability in the grand jury
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This burden, far from being unreasonable, would assure that the
subpoena has been properly issued and enforced.0
C. Crime-Fraud Analogy
The concept of a preliminary showing before enforcement of a
subpoena to compel disclosure of unprivileged information is not
new.68 For example, before a subpoena is issued to obtain commu-
nications believed to be in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent
activity, the government must make a preliminary prima facie
showing of the impropriety." Although these communications are
not considered privileged, the showing is required in deference to
the special relationship between the attorney and his client. 0
context. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412-F.Supp.-943,946-47(E--..Pa.
1976). Since the attorney's records are not covered by the work product doctrine, see FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), it is submitted that a showing of reasonable need, rather than substantial
need, would be adequate to protect the interests involved.
" See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
" See Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 281 (8th Cir. 1984) (re-
quired prima facie showing that advice was obtained to further criminal or fraudulent activ-
ity); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield 1), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973) (required
preliminary showing of relevancy for each item requested); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Legal Servs. Center), 615 F.Supp. 958, 964 (D. Mass. 1985) (required to show necessity of
information sought).
1" Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933). The Court, per Justice Cardozo, in
discussing the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, stated: "There must
be a showing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that the light should be let
in." Id. See In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hodge & Zweig,
548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977). For background information concerning the crime-
fraud exception, see in general 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 2298, 2299 (McNaughton rev.
1961); Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A. J. 708,
710 (1961).
70 Cf. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). Justice Cardozo explained the test in
Clark:
There are early cases apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not
supported by any evidence, will set the confidences free .... It is obvious that it
would be absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of merely by making a
charge of fraud" (quoting O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604). To drive
the privilege away, there must be 'something to give colour to the charge;' there
must be 'prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact.'
Id.
This primafade showing suggests that the courts do not want to arbitrarily interfere in
the attorney-client relationship. Cf United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d
Cir. 1972) ("protection [provided by the right of counsel of one's choice] goes no further
than preventing arbitrary dismissal of the chosen attorney"), rev'd on other grounds, 465
U.S. 259 (1984). Thus, by requiring some preliminary showing, like the primafacie showing
of criminal or fraudulent activity, the courts can prevent the arbitrary dismissal of an attor-
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Since this added protection is given to materials clearly not privi-
leged, it is submitted that there is no reason not to require a pre-
liminary showing when subpoenaing an attorney to obtain the cli-
ent's identity or legal fees charged, information which also has
been held to be unprivileged.7 ' The protection of the attorney-
client relationship is sufficient reason to warrant this conclusion.7
D. State and Federal Legislative Action
If the judiciary should fail to take proper action to protect the
attorney-client relationship, then it is submitted that the state and
federal governments should enact statutes to further this goal.
In Branzberg v. Hayes, 3 the Supreme Court held that there was
no constitutional or common law privilege preventing a reporter
ney. Cf. In re Special GrandJury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1010-11 (court must
balance public interest with the preservation of attorney-client relationship), vacated on
other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982).
7' See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 24 & 70 and accompanying text. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212,
223 (3d Cir. 1945), af'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the court rec-
ognized a privilege for the work product of an attorney. Id. The court concluded that the
policy supporting the attorney-client privilege, that of encouraging full disclosure, required
that a privilege also protect work product from discovery. Id. at 222-23. The work product
privilege, according to the court in Hickman, protected "intangible things, the results of the
lawyer's use of his tongue, his pen, and his head, for his client." Id. at 223.
In 1970, the Hickman ruling was partially codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The rule
states in part:
Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this
rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise dis-
coverable under (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that party's representative (including his
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means.
Id.
The work product doctrine has also been applied in criminal and grand jury proceed-
ings. See, e.g., United States v. Noble, 422 U.S. 225, 227 (1975) (applicable to criminal
proceedings); In re Grand Jury Investigations (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (applicable to grand jury proceedings).
The basic rationale supporting the work product doctrine "is to assure that an attorney
is not inhibited in his representation of his client by fear that his files will be open to
scrutiny upon demand of an opposing party." In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 334 (8th Cir.
1977). It is submitted that the same rationale is applicable whenever an attorney is forced
to testify against his client and a preliminary showing of relevancy and need should be
required to safeguard against unwarranted intrusions into the attorney-client relationship.
" 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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from revealing the source of his information to a grand jury."4
The Court rejected any requirement that a preliminary showing
be made before the grand jury could subpoena a reporter to dis-
close the source of his information. 5 Despite this decision, a num-
ber of state legislatures recognized the importance of protecting
the reporter's first amendment rights and created a statutory priv-
ilege for the reporter. 6 Under these "shield" laws, the reporter
generally is not required to disclose the source of his informa-
tion. In some states, the reporter may withhold the information
received as well as the identity of his source. 8
Supplementing state shield laws are regulations promulgated by
the Department of Justice which prevent infringement upon free-
dom of the press resulting from the arbitrary issuance of grand
jury subpoenas to reporters.79 These guidelines require a prosecu-
tor to make "all reasonable attempts" 80 to obtain information
from other sources before subpoenaing a journalist.8 1 Violation of
these regulations is grounds for disciplinary action. 82 Similar
guidelines have been proposed governing the issuance of subpoe-
nas to lawyers and are presently under consideration by the De-
"Id. at 690-91, 698-99.
"Id. at 708.
' See, e.g., CAL EVID. CODE § 1070 (Supp. 1986) (reporter privileged from disclosing
source of information); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1985) (same); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1986) (same). For a collection of all the shield statutes in
effect, see Note, Shield Statutes: A Changing Problem in the Light of Branzburg, 25 WAYNE L.
REV. 1381, 1386 n.40 (1979).
"' See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West Supp. 1984) (prohibiting disclosure of materials
which would tend to identify sources). See Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil
Serv. Bd., 341 So.2d 1206, 1209 (La. App. 1976).
' See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 49-275 (1985); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1985).
"28 C.FR. § 50.10 (1985). The purpose of this regulation is obvious from the language
of its preamble: "This policy statement is . . .to *provide protection for the news media
from forms of compulsory process, whether civil or criminal, which might impair the news
gathering function." Id.
"Id. § 50.10(b).
8I Id.
Id. § 50.10(n). Violation of the provisions of this regulation constitute grounds for
disciplinary action but are not intended to create any legally enforceable right in any per-
son. Id. While this action by the Justice Department is commendable, it is submitted that it
is insufficient because the subpoena will be legally enforceable even though the prosecu-
tor violated the guidelines. Cf United States v. Schulmann, 466 F. Supp. 293, 297-98
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (interpreting similar regulation as insufficient reason to dismiss indict-
ment).
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partment of Justice.8 3
These legislative and administrative actions were adopted to
combat the chilling effect that subpoenas had on the report-
er's ability to effectively gather information from confidential
sources.8 4 It is suggested that similar action should be taken to
stifle the chilling effect that these subpoenas have on the attorney-
client relationship.85 The very nature of this relationship dictates
that it should be given as much, if not more, protection than the
relationship between the reporter and his source.88
" See 9 US. A-rrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-2.161(a). The guidelines call for prior judicial ap-
proval before a subpoena can be issued. Id. Before a judge approves a subpoena, according
to the guidelines, there must be a finding that: 1) the information sought is not protected
from disclosure by the lawyer-client privilege or the work product doctrine and it is rele-
vant to the investigation; 2) the purpose is not primarily to harass the lawyer or the client;
and 3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information. Id.
A different set of guidelines has recently been approved by the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York. See Frank, Att'y Subpoenas, 72 A.BA J., March 1, 1986, at 32, 33.
These standards direct that:. 1) lawyer subpoenas be supported by an "affidavit of neces-
sity;" 2) prosecutors seek information from lawyers on a voluntary basis first; and 3) U.S.
Attorneys give prior written approval for the issuance of a subpoena. Id.
The highest court of Massachusetts has even gone so far as to bar prosecutors from
issuing subpoenas without prior judicial approval. SJ.C. RULE 3:08, PF 15. The rule states:
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney to a grand jury
without prior judicial approval in circumstances where the prosecutor seeks to com-
pel the attorney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is repre-
sented by the attorney/witness.
Id.
This rule withstood a challenge in federal court when the district court for the District
of Massachusetts held "that Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:08 Prosecution Function 15 is
valid as not in conflict with federal law .... See United States v. Mass. Bar Ass'n, Civil
Action No. 85-4809-Z (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
- See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1985). The preamble to the statute states:
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of reporters to
investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of the government should
not be used in such a way that it impairs a reporter's responsibility to cover as
broadly as possible controversial public issues. This policy statement is thus intended
to provide protection for the news media from forms of process, whether civil or
criminal, which might impair the newsgathering function.
Id.
as See Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys. A Proposal for Reform, 25 AM.
CRIM. L. Rav. 95, 125 (1985).
" Cf. E. CLEARY. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 204-05 (3d ed. 1984). Both the work
product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege are firmly established in the common
law. Id. No such privilege has been recognized for a reporter. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 685 (1972).
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CONCLUSION
Documents relating to client identities and legal fees paid to an
attorney are clearly not within the attorney-client privilege.8 7
Neither, though, are statements made in furtherance of a crime
or fraud. 88 If the latter form of non-privileged communications
warrant a prima face showing of impropriety, then it is not only
reasonable, but desirable, for the judiciary to require a prelimi-
nary showing of relevancy and need before compelling disclosure
of these documents. This has the laudable effect of protecting the
attorney-client relationship from unreasonable strains. In the ab-
sence of judicial action under its supervisory powers over federal
grand juries, one must hope that appropriate legislation will be
passed to effectuate the commendable purpose of protecting the
attorney-client relationship.
Daniel J. O'Donnell
87 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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